

Reconstruction as a Solution to the Problems of Media Content and Form

October 19, 2015

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The media is organized in a hierarchy which some communications theorists call a communications chain, with the public audience at the bottom, elites at the top and journalists in the middle (Figure 1, Appendices).¹ Newspapers are a key resource which provide Swedes with information. In 1990, 87 percent of Swedes polled read a morning paper and 35 percent read an evening paper at least three days a week. By 2014, these proportions were down to 58 and 10 percent, respectively. In 2014, 38 percent were reading a morning newspaper on the internet and 27 percent were reading an evening paper that way.² SVT's share of viewing time decreased from 43 percent to 35 percent from 2002 to 2007 although over this period Swedish public service radio's share declined from 52 percent to only 48 percent.³ In 2014, SVT's market share among TV viewers was 35 percent in contrast to TV4's share of 30 percent.⁴

One key period of political focus was the period of submarine hunts and the discovery of a Russian submarine in Sweden during the 1980s. During that time, the Swedish government "returned to a more limited, military oriented agenda." One reason was the new Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The other was "the discovery of foreign

¹ One author suggests the need to revise "the theory of propaganda, away from a model where control over the entire communications chain means that the propagandist can concentrate on the most effective form of message delivery to maximize the attitudinal and behavioural impact of the messages...Instead, modern theories of propaganda concentrate on the ways in which governments influence the communications process by intervening in the relationship between the journalist and the event the journalist reports. Such studies converge with the well-established literature on the relationship between journalists and their sources." See: Jerry Palmer, "Review Article: Media Performance and War Efforts," *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2005: 382. This apparent critique of the idea of the communications chain and control along it fails to see how the way journalists are trained, hired and fired may affect the reporting more than a journalist's relation to her or his sources.

² Ulrika Andersson, "Dagspressens digitala plattformar alltmer använda – men papperstidningen är fortfarande Betydelsefull," in *Fragment*, Annika Bergström, Bengt Johansson, Henrik Oscarsson & Maria Oskarson, eds., Göteborgs universitet: SOM-institutet, 2015: 418.

³ "The Swedish PSB Contribution," Results of the consultation: revision of the Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, European Commission, Brussels, 2008. Accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_broadcasting/spsb.pdf. Accessed October 16, 2015.

⁴ "TV-Året 2014," Mediamätning i Skandinavien AB, Stockholm, February 3, 2015: 14. Accessible at: http://mms.se:88/wp-content/uploads/_dokument/presentationer/Akademi/2015-02-05_MMS_TV-aret_2014.pdf. Accessed October 17, 2015.

submarine activities in Swedish waters.” Of particular importance of “for the remilitarization” of the Swedish agenda, was “the grounding of the Soviet submarine U137 in 1981—the ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’—nearby the Swedish naval base in Karlskrona.”⁵

The remilitarization of the Swedish agenda in the 1980s was based on a formula that linked a topical event (submarines in Swedish waters), a framing system, with a flow of commentary from experts, a mass media platform for distributing the flow building on this topical event and political entrepreneurs who exploit the apparent threats (Figure 1 Appendices). The framing system was the identification of the submarines as a threat, i.e. what is called their “securitization.” Parts of this formula have been explained as follows:

when events or crises of a military nature are recognized there is an institutionalized mechanism for securitizing them and putting them on the agenda. That is why the discovery foreign submarine activities instantly got onto the agenda as a “new” military peacetime threat in the 1980s. The navy and the military intelligence service were ready, and soon provided a huge amount of information on these activities; it was reported that more than 500 incidents in the 1980s most likely were foreign submarine intrusions.⁶

This quotation omits the key role played by politicians as *political entrepreneurs* who exploit the apparent threat. For example, during the 1980s the submarine hunts favored the bourgeois (right-wing) political parties. The greatest beneficiary was the Conservative Party (*Moderaterna*), and the submarine hunts were the “political breakthrough” for Carl Bildt.⁷ A political entrepreneur can be defined as anyone who tries to mobilize public opinion around a public issue with which they have greater or lesser expertise.

⁵ Johan Eriksson, “Agendas, Threats, and Politics: Securitization in Sweden” Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, workshop ‘Redefining Security’, Mannheim, March 26-31, 1999.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ K.-G. Bergström, “Overkligt med ubåtsjakt igen,” *Expressen*, October 18, 2014. Accessible at: <http://www.expressen.se/kronikoret/k-g-bergstrom/bergstrom-overkligt-med-ubatsjakt-igen/>. Accessed October 17, 2015.

The academic system trains journalists and many activists in social movements and can thereby help shape their framing system upstream.⁸ Downstream experts provide information that flows throughout the communications chain (highlighted in red arrows).

As seen in Figure 1 (Appendices), experts can influence both the media and political entrepreneurs, i.e. the media and political entrepreneurs selective use experts that they consider “legitimate.” The critical role that experts can play is highlighted by various news stories and the depth of legitimacy which the expert carries. Consider the Swedish military analyst Niklas Granholm who works at FOI (*Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut*). During the Summer of 2015, Granholm was the key feature of an article entitled, “Russian submarine exercise sends a clear signal,” published in *Svenska Dagbladet*. Grandholm claimed that Russia’s planned military exercise in the Arctic with three new nuclear-strategic submarines would send “a clear signal that Russia is moving toward a new global influence.”⁹

The projection of military framing and threats that lead to increases in the military budget are based on some combination of actors involving military experts and political entrepreneurs and how these contend with opponents. We can see begin to identify how these contests operate by examining several pieces of data.

First, Granholm was the sole source of the previously quoted article. Second, a Google search on October 17, 2015 revealed that the word submarine in Swedish (*ubåt*) and Granholm’s name set off by quotations (“*Niklas Granholm*” *ubåt*) led 616 hits but the words “Niklas Granholm” alone gave 2,490 hits. In other words, one very rough indicator of Granholm’s media presence is tied to the discourse on submarines, which is tied to 24.7 percent of his Google media presence. This is not surprising because 33.6 percent of his media presence is tied to Russia. In fact, a fair share of the media representation of various supporters and opponents of the status quo in Swedish foreign policy is tied to mentions of Russia or submarines (Table 1 in Appendices).

⁸ Mark Deuze, “What is journalism? Professional identity and ideology of journalists reconsidered,” *Journalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2005: 442-464. See also: Jonathan Michael Feldman, “Turn On, Tune In, Drop In: The New Economy Virtuous Cycle,” *The Global Teach-In*, September 3, 2013. Accessible at: <http://www.globalteachin.com/turn-on-tune-in-drop-in-the-new-economy-virtuous-cycle>.

⁹ Olle Nygårds, “Ryska ubåtsövningen skickar tydlig signal,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, August 2, 2015. Accessible at: <http://www.svd.se/ryska-ubatsovningen-skickar-tydlig-signal/om/det-skarpta-sakerhetslaget>. Accessed October 17, 2015.

Table 1 shows us that certain anti-NATO or anti-militarist spokespersons have a fair degree of media power, but key representatives like the head of Sweden's peace organization (Anna Ek) are overmatched by representatives of the foreign policy *status quo*. The table clearly indicates that the role of "expert" and political entrepreneur are often collapsed into one person. Politicians, government officials, cultural workers, and social movement activists are often relied upon to frame problems like assessing the Russian threat or the potential dangers of submarines. Sometimes political entrepreneurs, like Hans Blix, have legitimate credentials as experts and public intellectuals or political entrepreneurs. In other cases, we may have to assume that a political entrepreneur has the necessary expertise, but we can't be certain. Of course, the value of expertise is relative with some political entrepreneurs having a better model of reality than others.

The best way to illustrate this problem is to examine the extent to which certain terms associated with a comprehensive approach to foreign policy questions shows up in Swedish public discourse or academic discourse. A search of key terms related to Swedish foreign policy was performed on October 18, 2015 and placed in order of the number of hits they received in Google. A combination of English and Swedish terms were used. As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 2 (Appendices), external threats to Sweden have more representational power than comprehensive policies to make Sweden less threatening to other countries. For example, a search using the key Swedish terms "confidence building measures" and Russia gets about 9,000 hits, but searchers related to threats from Russia get from 23,000 to more than 28,000 hits. Table 2 shows how Sweden's trade ties to Russia have less media representation than Swedish trade with Russia. The security importance of Russian trade is almost never addressed in academic discourse. In Table 3, we see that academic discourse is relatively stable in how it frames key issues over time.

The relevance of the role played by academia in reproducing or shaping the system cannot be fully appreciated until we examine how the legitimacy of various institutions is changing and that certain institutions have more of the public's confidence than others (Table 4 Appendices). As can be seen there, the public does not have great confidence in the evening paper *Expressen* and while the public has greater confidence in both the Swedish government and parliament, the legitimacy of these two institutions has been slipping over the last five years.

In contrast, the public has greater confidence in Swedish radio and television, the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* and—most of all—the higher education system. The public not only has a greater confidence in these last three institutions, but the level of confidence has remained relatively constant. Yet, as we have seen there is evidence to suggest that such institutions reproduce a media ideology which screens out systematic challenges to the status quo. The evidence is suggested by how academic sources (represented by Google Scholar) and mass sources (represented by Google, where hits are often driven by recycling information from news outlets) tend to under-represent a more critical foreign policy and security discourse.

In academic discourse, key terms related to Swedish external threats get more attention than how Sweden could reduce international tensions or militarism through reducing arms exports or confidence building measures. Remarkably, attention to trade with Russia as a factor shaping Swedish foreign policy is neglected, as Russian threats are often considered without the mitigating impact of trade with Russia. While Swedish trade with Russia declined in 2012 and 2013, in the later year “Russia was Sweden’s 13th biggest export market and 7th biggest import market.” Sweden exports “automobiles, equipment for the telecommunications industry and chemicals” with Swedish imports from Russia consisting “mainly of raw materials, in particular crude oil.” Perhaps the most noteworthy item is the following: “Sweden is among the top ten foreign direct investors in Russia.” The Russian Central Bank says that Swedish direct investments in Russia were \$15.8 billion as of 1 January 2013.”¹⁰

Prospects for a New Media Space

There are several constraints on the power of major television stations and newspapers and even the alternative legitimacy of social media. First, digitalization changes the form in which many get their news. For example, during one week in October 2015, Expressen TV had “just over 4.5 million clip views on the mobile phone and the desktop...with 1,118,725 viewings of the phone and 3,411,426 in the computer.”¹¹ This kind of change does not

¹⁰ “Economic relations between Sweden and Russia,” Swedish Embassy, Moscow, Russia. Accessible at: <http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Moscow/Business/Economic-relations-between-Sweden-and-Russia/>. Accessed September 28, 2015.

¹¹ Thomas Mattson, “Dramatisk ökning av antalet tv-tittare,” *Expressen*, October 13, 2015. Accessible at: <http://bloggar.expressen.se/thomasmattsson/2015/10/dramatisk-okning-av-antalet-tv-tittare/>. Accessed October 17, 2015.

necessarily weaken the power of newspapers, but does change the location of where they organize audiences.

Second, the younger demographic is delinking from television. In 2014, among persons aged 16 to 65, 57 percent of viewing time was spent watching television, but among persons aged 16 to 25 only 36 percent of viewing time was so spent.¹² More generally, fewer persons are focused on even watching television, at least in a concentrated manner. The number of persons who watched five uninterrupted minutes of television shrank from 76.1 percent in 2000 to 71 percent in 2007 to 66.1 percent in 2014.¹³ Television obviously has competition from other media: a U.S. study found that 24 percent of persons aged thirteen to seventeen are “online almost constantly.”¹⁴ Of course, it is possible to watch television on a phone or computer.

Third, younger persons have less confidence in various established television and radio media (as opposed to social media) institutions than older persons, but still have a great deal of confidence in established media like SVT, SR, and *Dagens Nyheter* (Table 5 Appendices).

Fourth, despite the greater confidence in social media which young as opposed to old persons have, and their resilient confidence in established media, the confidence which young persons had in social media decreased faster than the loss of confidence in established media (Table 6 Appendices). A likely reason was the press reports in 2014 that “tens of thousands of accounts associated with customers of Microsoft, Google, Facebook and Yahoo have their data turned over to US government authorities every six months as the result of secret court orders.” The U.S. National Security Agency’s Prism program collects data from mostly non-American internet communications.¹⁵

¹² “TV-Året 2014,” op. cit.: 57-58.

¹³ Ibid.: 11.

¹⁴ Amanda Lenhart, “Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview,” The Pew Research Center, April 9, 2015. Accessible at: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/>.

¹⁵ Spencer Ackerman and Dominic Rushe, “Microsoft, Facebooks, Google and Yahoo release US surveillance requests,” *The Guardian*, February 3, 2014. Accessible at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/03/microsoft-facebook-google-yahoo-fisa-surveillance-requests>. Accessed October 18, 2015.

The potential delinking of younger persons from both established mass media and *established* mass social media opens the possibility for engagement in another kind of media space which does not yet exist. On the one hand, we have the potential rise of media power which displaces political power (and at least exclusive reliance upon face-to-face organizing) as the primary way to accumulate power in certain spaces. This movement is evident in both the media capital of various politicians documented in Table 1 and the diminished confidence in political as opposed to media institutions documented in Table 4. On the other hand, the credibility failures of certain media creates the possibility of thinking about *even newer forms of media space* as a place to validate legitimacy and engage audiences.

These openings and closures can be understood with respect to two kinds of media theories. First we should consider phases in the mass media. Consider two of the latter phases in the development of television. In *the core-periphery model*, there is no longer a monopoly exercised by public television. Starting in the 1990s, a number of hybrid channels emerged which offered “all-round programming,” but also fulfilled public service requirements like Swedish channel TV4. The point-to-mass system of diffusion is not control still occurs, but through a selection of points: “It becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a normative program policy, and viewers, for their part, are now able to compose their own menus, which may well deviate from the majority’s.”¹⁶ This amounts to the creation of program niches. In addition, we see “the golden age of demographic targeting: channels commit considerable effort to identifying relatively large, homogeneous subgroups among the viewing audience.” This core-periphery model became dominant in the 1990s, although there was “a noticeable trend away from the center—in Sweden ‘the Big Five’: SVT1, SVT2, and the commercial channels TV3, TV4 and Kanal 5.”

The final model has been called “the breakup model,” which media researchers call “the ultimate stage of development” which is “one of extreme fragmentation.” Now, media centers have disintegrated, and viewing is spread thinly over myriad channels.” There are no collective viewing patterns that can be seen in time or space and viewers only sporadically share their viewing experiences socially. This model is predicted to occur “when digitization

¹⁶ By “point” I mean a focused point of communication, like a computer, microphone or television camera directed from a spatially concentrated place. By “mass” I mean a decentralized point of reception such as viewers of computer screens, listeners of radio or television viewers. Point-to-point communication usually takes the form of emails, phone calls and text messages involving one person communicating a message to another individual.

is fully implemented and the digital multichannel system is operative and used.” At this point, there is no longer a “majority audience,” but the “breakup model still ties in the future” even if “the trend toward increasing fragmentation is already well under way.”¹⁷

The problem with such projections is not that they do not accurately depict probable changes in delivery platforms. Rather, the limitation is that they do not depict the potential of a kind of return to the past in which audiences seek a more active relationship to creating content and forming media networks. Such networks might fill the void created by fragmentation. In addition, these predictions fail to explain the popularity of various mass media events focused on a few performers designed to raise money for refugees or the characteristics of the ever popular Euro Vision Song Contest.¹⁸

Second, the background to these openings and closures can also be partially seen in the concept of the *mediatization* of politics developed by Jesper Strömbäck. Strömbäck has formalized a theory in which the media gains power vis-à-vis both interpersonal communication and politicians and thereby establishes itself as an agenda setting system relatively independent of each. Media becomes less responsive to politicians and politicians become more responsive to the media. This movement is represented by the second and third columns in Table 7 in Appendices (which directly use Strömbäck’s logic). The problem with this formulation is that it fails to acknowledge how media institutions can lose legitimacy, how face-to-face and mediated communication can be combined, and how the legitimacy and origins of ideas can be important.

As a result of these considerations, I have added a fourth column, which I refer to as *reconstructive media*. The idea of reconstructive media is that the media becomes a tool to remake society upon democratic lines. The underlying logic is that both politicians and the mass media (be it electronic or social) have to be remade. The accountability systems which

¹⁷ Anna Edin, “Times Have Changed: On the Relationship Between Swedish Public Service Television and the Viewing Public,” *Nordicom Review*, Vol. 27, No 2: 61-72. Accessible at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/242_edin_2.pdf. Accessed October 19, 2015.

¹⁸ On the concert for refugees, many diverse channels covered a widely popularized event. Nearly 200 million persons watched the Eurovision Song Contest in 2015. See Georg Cederskog, “Hela Sverige skramlar: Artisteliten manifesterar för flyktingarna,” *Dagens Nyheter*, September 29, 2015. Accessible at: <http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/musik/hela-sverige-skramlar-artisteliten-manifesterar-for-flyktingarna/> and “Nearly 200 million people watch Eurovision 2015,” Eurovision TV, 2015. Accessible at: http://www.eurovision.tv/page/news?id=nearly_200_million_people_watch_eurovision_2015. Accessed October 24, 2015.

hold politicians accountability to the public potentially declines in a bureaucratic society or political system in which trade unions and other mediating institutions weaken in power. Yet, the mass media itself is also bureaucratized when it takes the form of point-to-mass electronics communications. The celebratory promotion of social media as a point-to-point alternative will inevitably reach a dead end because of several factors including: a) the use of mediated communications as a poor substitute for face-to-face dialogue, b) the potential vapidness of social media as a recycling system for intellectual content developed elsewhere, c) the dispersal of communication as a potentially weak response to the concentrated power of both politicians and the mass electronic media.

The reconstructionist approach can be explained as follows. The overarching consideration is the relationship between the political (the government/state), the media and a mobilized group of citizens. While Strömbäck discusses what is or is not political as opposed to media-directed, he does not distinguish between that which the media projects or organizes and that which is projected or organized by a network of citizens. Here, some ideas by Manuel Castells in his book *Communication Power* are relevant. He writes: “if you think differently, communication networks will operate differently, on the condition that not only you, but I and a multitude choose to build the networks of our lives.”¹⁹

The basic problem illustrated above is the separation of knowledge (comprehensive ideas about comprehensive problems) and power (the ability to support awareness about and implementation of the comprehensive ideas through plans and new institutions). As a result, we can define the reconstructionist project in media as follows.

First, the content of media is as important as its form. This corresponds to (1)(C). Study circles which analyze social problems and bring comprehensive solutions to the public by acting can play a key role here. In our above examples, this would involve promoting ideas like providing civilian alternatives to arms contractors, creating job ladders to qualified jobs, and linking green technology to cooperatives which locally manufactured energy systems. Information is ultimately generated by groups that use media rather than media that uses groups. If you electronically link several face-to-face groups that project and exchange ideas, you cannot make the simple distinction between experiences or interpersonal

¹⁹ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009: 432.

communications on the one hand and mediated exchanges of such information on the other hand. The key point is that now we have: point-to-point and point-to-mass communication and in one sense mass-to-mass communication rather than just a concentrated media broadcast to the masses in the audience. In contrast, rather than use the media to link large numbers of groups across the country who communicate with one another in real time, the media orchestrates the idea of a community by putting a few dozen persons they have selected and screened into a studio.

Second, being independent of the government/state is not the same thing as exploiting that independence by mass mobilization. This corresponds to the (2)(C). If a group that organizes an event they can design and control both: (a) gains the media's attention for the event, and (b) organizes their own media to link the event over multiple spaces (defined by both locations and distribution channels)²⁰ then the combination of (a) and (b) makes the media more dependent on grassroots mobilization. Castells writes: "The fact that politics is essentially played out in the media does not mean that other factors...are not significant in deciding the outcome of political contests. Neither does it imply that the media are the power-holders...they are the space of power-making."²¹

Third, the directing forces of what is said and done by the media are usually either politicians as in (3)(A) or media producers/owners of broadcast networks as in (3)(B). As politicians adapt to the mass media, the media begins to drive the content of what is said and the media no longer adapts to a politician's discourse, i.e. the media is no longer simply the mirror of what a politician says. This is the movement from (3)(A) to (3)(B). As example might be a debate on Swedish foreign policy in which the basic terms of a Russian threat have already been established by weeks, months and years of Swedish television and newspaper coverage, i.e. the terms of the debate are set and can often constrain what a politician says. As suggested by Table 1, politicians, political entrepreneurs or intellectuals can differ in what ideas they project with some less defined by one discourse as opposed to another. Yet, Table 2 clearly illustrates how there is an uneven development of ideas, i.e. some ideas are more popular than others.

²⁰ A location refers to a geographically-fixed site where people assemble and broadcast. A distribution channel could refer to different venues where persons meet or ideas are distributed such as a museum exhibition, radio broadcast or mass meeting.

²¹ Ibid.: 194.

The alternative to both is the design and creation of a citizen network, run by a social movement as in (3)(C). The (3)(A) mode occurs as when a politician or groups of politicians command greater media power and control over information and decision making which the mass media feels obligated to simply relate or reproduce. In theory and in practice, a media event can combine (3)(A), (3)(B) and (3)(C).

Fourth, we need to consider what the state (as opposed to the mass media) responds to. A politician may look at the uneven distribution of the power of ideas manifested in Table 2 and decide to simply support those ideas that are most popular, even as what is most popular changes. Thus, the recent shift of the Moderate party on immigrants, public beggars, and the like might be a response to a new situation or a response to competition from the far-right Swedish Democrats, but this far-right party itself is partially a media creation. Or, the public because of the uneven distribution of ideas manifested in Table 2 and Figure 2, decides to back a political party X that becomes very popular. When another party Y tries to compete with X, are they simply responding to politics or media? This question represents the distinction between (4)(A) and (4)(B). The reconstructive approach assumes that there is a third possibility, i.e. a group can rally and organize around and support ideas which are lower on the hierarchy in Table 2 or Figure 2 (and not simply less popular ideas, but less popular ideas which correspond to comprehensive solutions), i.e. this is the possibility represented by (4)(C).

Several models illustrate how it is possible to combine social media and face-to-face action. These models include: a) The Occupy Movement and Arab Spring, which built on mechanisms like Twitter and Facebook and b) The April 25, 2012 Global Teach-In which built upon email communication, a website, and interactive computer-based communication software. The problem is that the Occupy Movement's "horizontal" character had what turned out to be a rather weak internal pedagogic system such that the movement began to revolve around occupation park and related public spaces as opposed to policies, new institutions and other interventions beyond the scope of police surveillance and control.

Media theorists tend to assume that the public is either a consumer of mass electronic media (like radio and television), or a user of social media. The former tends to emphasize the

organizational form of point-to-mass communication, ownership structures and decision-making bureaucracies. The latter tends to emphasize the superficial control the user and consumer of social media has over their own Twitter and Facebook account (and enables point-to-point communication). The recent NSA-related scandals began to question this superficial control and led to a loss in legitimacy. The problem, however, is that the distinction between the former and the latter often amounts to centralized versus decentralized superficiality. It is possible of course to put “profound” content on the web and into social media consumption. The problem, however, is that the most sophisticated and comprehensive content requires relatively sophisticated audiences. These audiences are often small and unmade by the *structured superficiality* of the universities and social movements themselves (as noted above and in Table 2 and Figure 2).²²

The term “structured superficiality” corresponds to how agents that in theory promote enlightenment actually promote superficiality. The superficiality occurs through *substitution effects*, i.e. a radical sounding idea replaces an authentically radical idea where the word “radical” means something that gets at the root of problems. A related problem can be seen in how social movement intellectuals, non-profit organizations and so-called leaders really are mis-leaders.

This phenomena related to the gap between intellectuals and more comprehensive solutions has been documented by several analysts.²³ They argue that it is not just enough to point to elites or the mainstream as misguided. Rather, the oppositional left itself can be misguided. To simplify, many intellectuals will gravitate to ideas that are not the lowest (least popular) in the hierarchy defined by Table 2. This focus on the popular concepts will give them an audience for their lectures, grant writing applications, internet posts, and meetings with politicians, etc. The power of the intellectual advances, but not necessarily knowledge or comprehensive solutions. The classical break between intellectuals and the public identified by C. Wright Mills in *The Sociological Imagination* also contained the idea that intellectuals ought to uncover structures rather than relate simply to abstract ideas or empirically driven banalities.²⁴

²² See Jonathan M. Feldman, “After Iowa and New Hampshire,” *Counterpunch*, January 8, 2008. Accessible at: <http://www.counterpunch.org/2008/01/08/after-iowa-and-new-hampshire/>. Accessed October 19, 2015.


²³ See: Adolph Reed, Jr., “Black Particularity Reconsidered,” *Telos*, Vol. 172, No. 39: 71-93.

²⁴ C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Alternatives require: (a) identifying the causes of problems, (b) developing comprehensive solutions and plans, and (c) creating a power mechanism to promote the solutions, with (d) necessary accountability, well designed-implementation, feedback systems and oversight.

Appendices

Figure 1: Key Influences on Foreign Policy Opinion Communications Chain



**Table 1: Representation of Different Political Entrepreneurs in Swedish Media:
October 17, 2015**

Name	Background	Google Hits for Name and “Russia” in Swedish	Google Hits for Name and “submarine” in Swedish	Number of Hits for Name in Google	Number of followers on Twitter account	Number of mentions in <i>Dagens Nyheter</i>	Number mentions in SVT Play
Supporters of Russian Threat Construction or Identified with current Foreign Policy Paradigm							
Carl Bildt	Former Prime Minister and Defense Minister	133,000	13,000	628,000	450,137*	9,405	50
Niklas Granholm	Defense expert	836	616	2,490	NA	15	0
Peter Hultqvist	Current Defense Minister	58,700	14,500	171,000	NA	458	30
Sverker Göranson	Retired head of Swedish military	14,800	8,800	61,500	NA	198	13
Linda Nordlund**	Blogger	3,060	983	21,900	4,820	29	1
Birgitta Ohlsson**	Member of parliament	51,500	26,400	234,000	62,445	798	19
Opponents of NATO and Russian Threat Construction or Opposed to Dominant Foreign Policy Paradigm							
Hans Blix	Former diplomat and disarmament champion	9,500	1,620	352,000	NA	819	6
Anna Ek	Head of <i>Svenska Freds</i>	3,820	1,090	41,200	3,547	57	9***

Sven Hirdman	Former Swedish Ambassador to Russia and NATO critic	5,590	1,650	10,900	NA	164	2
Stina Oscarson	Critic of NATO and cultural worker	79,600	9,660	169,000	NA	174	2
Maj Wechselmann	Critic of Swedish foreign policy and filmmaker	7,490	583	19,400	290	0	0
Gudrun Schyman	Head of Feminist Initiative and NATO critic	67,100	31,200	372,000	108,508	3,653	31

Note: Name searches are always performed placing the entire name in quotation marks.

Legend:

NA – Not applicable, Not available or unknown.

*-37,711 followers in a separate account in Swedish.

**-NATO supporter.

***-This is probably an over-representation because of limits to the search engine.

Table 2: Key Terms Related to Swedish Security and Foreign Policy and their Media Representation in Google and Youtube

Key Search Term	Google Search of term on October 18, 2015.	Youtube Search on October 18, 2015.	Google Scholar Hits on October 18, 2015
“omställning från försvars produktion”	0	0	0
“omställning till civil produktion”	258	0	2
“Ryskt hot mot Gotland”	350	0	1
“Swedish weapons exports”	401	0	9
“invasion mot Sverige” Ryssland	504	0	7

“Svensk handel med Ryssland”	1,190	0	0
“Swedish trade with Russia”	1,350	0	6
“Swedish arms exports”	1,660	22	41
“Swedish security policy”	5,440	1	500
“Ryska hotet mot Sverige”	7,500	1	2
“hotet från Ryssland”	8,050	74	58
“Svensk säkerhet”	8,850	19	116
“förtroendeskapande åtgärder” Ryssland	9,040	0	56
Putin “Hot mot Sverige”	17,800	7	27
“Ryssland” “hot mot Sverige”	23,200	7	128
“Svensk vapenexport”	28,500	405	75
“Swedish defense”	51,100	177	3,300
“Svenska försvaret”	165,000	1,590	828

Source: Google search by author on October 18, 2015.

Table 3: Key Terms Related to Swedish Security and Foreign Policy and their Media Representation in Google Scholar

Search Term	Google Scholar Search on September 22, 2013	Google Scholar Search on September 22, 2015	Absolute Change Over Time
“Swedish weapons exports”	7	9	2

“Swedish arms exports”	33	41	8
“Svensk vapenexport”	52	75	23
“Swedish security policy”	353	498	145
“Swedish defense”	2,770	3,270	500
“Svensk säkerhet”	40,200	48,100	7,900

Source: Author's Google Scholar Searches.

Table 4: The Changing Legitimacy of Key Institutions: Proportion of the Public Having Much or Great Confidence in Various Institutions

Year	<i>Expressen</i>	The Swedish Government	Swedish Parliament	Swedish Radio and TV	<i>Dagens Nyheter</i>	Higher Education
2007	9	NA	40	48	57	62
2008	17	41	42	52	58	62
2009	14	47	40	41	57	64
2010	13	62	55	48	52	65
2011	14	51	46	47	50	62
2012	14	53	48	48	50	64
2013	10	50	45	48	52	65
2014	10	41	42	47	52	64

Source: “Förtroendebarmeter 2014: Allmänhetens Förtroende för Institutioner, Politiska Partier, Massmedier & Företag,” SIFO AB, Stockholm, June 3, 2014. Accessible at: http://medieakademien.se/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/2014_MedieAkademins_Fortroendebarmeter_140228.pdf. Accessed October 18, 2015.

Table 5: Percent Having Much or a Great Deal of Confidence in the Media Institution

Media	Younger 16-29	Older 65-74
SVT	69	72
SR	68	77
Google	59	40
<i>Dagens Nyheter</i>	54	54
Wikipedia	46	29
TV4	34	32
Twitter	15	4
Facebook	14	11

Source: "Förtroendebarmeter 2014: Allmänhetens Förtroende för Institutioner, Politiska Partier, Massmedier & Företag," SIFO AB, Stockholm, June 3, 2014. Accessible at: http://medieakademien.se/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/2014_MedieAkedemins_Fortroendebarmeter_140228.pdf. Accessed October 18, 2015.

Table 6: Percent of Persons 16-29 Having Confidence in Various Media Institutions from 2013-2014

Media	2013	2014	Percent Change
Facebook	31	14	-17
Google	76	59	-17
Twitter	28	15	-13
SR	79	68	-11
SVT	79	69	-10
TV4	43	34	-9
Local newspaper	54	46	-8
Aftonbladet.se	20	12	-8

Source: "Förtroendebarmeter 2014: Allmänhetens Förtroende för Institutioner, Politiska Partier, Massmedier & Företag," SIFO AB, Stockholm, June 3, 2014. Accessible at: http://medieakademien.se/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/2014_MedieAkedemins_Fortroendebarmeter_140228.pdf. Accessed October 18, 2015.

Table 7: The Logic of Mediatization and Reconstructionist Alternatives

Source: Author and adapted from Jesper Strömbäck, "Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics," Press/Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3: 228-246.

Key factor		(A) Pre-Mediatization	(B) Post-Mediatization	(C) Reconstructionist Media
(1)	Most important source of information	Experiences or interpersonal communication	The media	Study and action circles tied to mediated extension
(2)	Media dependency	Media mainly dependent on political institutions	Media mainly independent of political institutions	Media dependent on grassroots mobilization
(3)	Media content	Media content mainly governed by political logic	Media content mainly governed by media logic	Established electronic and social media responsive to public media fora
(4)	Political actors steered by	Political actors mainly governed by political logic	Political actors mainly governed by media logic	Political actors responsive to democratic media